



Visiting China today is perhaps notunlikevisitc
ing a bustling town in America's Old West: the
railroad has arrived, opening up the town's
products to vast markets in the East. Farms,
ranches, and lumber yards are expanding
rapidly. New construction is everywhere. Pros-
perity and boundless optimism are in the air.
But then someone calls: "Fire! Fire!" Already,
flames are leaping into the sky and spreading.
The whole town is now panicked by the con-
flagration. It seems that the townspeople have
been preoccupied with construction, and have
not taken time to organize fire brigades and
acquire fire-fighting equipment.
In this little allegory, the railroad is the eco-
nomic reform since 1978 which has brought
rapid economic growth and a rising standard of
living to China; the fire is an accelerating infla-
tion that threatens much of what economic
reform has brought to date.
The subject of China's economic reform and its
current inflation concerns not only the liveli-
hood of that nation's more than one billion
inhabitants, but also the stability and prosperity
of a region of substantial politicaland eco-
nomic interest to the United States and the rest
of the Western world. Moreover, given China's
lead in economic reform, its success or failure
in controlling inflation will have a significant
impact on the future of economic reform in
other socialist nations, including that of the
Soviet Union.
Sweet fruits of economic reform
In December 1978, China's leaders adopted a
program of economic reform to move the nation
away from a Soviet-type planned economy to-
ward one that would rely more on market
mechanisms within a socialist framework. The
tension arising from these two apparently con-
flicting goals-market mechanism and socialist
economy-has presented policymakers with
serious challenges in uncharted territory.
The reformstarted inthe rural area where 80
percent of the population resides. The com-
munes were replaced by a "production re-
sponsibility" system, under which individual
households leased land for fifteen years in
return for a commitment to pay taxes and fulfill
planned production quotas. After meeting these
obligations, the rural households have been free
to produce whatever they choose and sell the
above-quota output on the "free market" at
prices which, though still regulated, could be
considerably higher than the official prices.
This simple but sweeping reform, plus signifi-
cant increases in the official purchase prices of
farm products, released a large reservoir of pro-
ductive initiative and energy formerly dammed
up in the communes. Farm output increased so
rapidly that for a few years until consumption
caught up, granaries were bulging with surplus
grains. The nation turned from a major cotton
importer to a sizable cotton exporter-to the
chagrin of u.s. cotton growers. Even more re-
markably, rural industrial development took off,
turning out a wide range of consumer products,
construction materials, and industrial compo-
nents and parts. Unplanned and unregulated by
the state, rural industries soon became the fast-
est growing sector of the economy. In 1987, for
the first time, the value of rural industrial pro-
duction exceeded that of farm production.
Encouraged by the success of rural reform, the
leaders in 1984 launched a program of urban re-
form. The new program granted substantial
autonomy to urban enterprises in managing their
own businesses, drastically reduced the scope of
mandatory planning, and opened the national
economy to foreign trade and foreign investment.
The enterprises that still fall under mandatory
planning are required to produce and deliver to
the state in quantities and at prices specified by
the planning authorities. However, their above-
quota output as well as the output of enterprises
outside mandatory planning now can be sold at
prices that are negotiated between buyers and
sellers, within ranges set by the authorities.FRBSF
The results of economic reform have been as-
tounding. Since 1980, real national income and
industrial and agricultural output have all grown
at about 10 percent compound annual rates.
Farmers' per capita real income has doubled,
and that of urban dwellers has increased by 43
percent.Gon~arethe IOl1glines ()fp_eopIehold-
ing ration coupons in front offood stores.
Housing shortages-though still acute,especially
in urban areas-arebeing relieved by thecon-
struction of high-rise apartments in cities and
attractive single-familytwo-story buildings in the
countryside. Besides bicycles, city streets are
now jammed with automobiles, mostly imported.
Refrigerators, color televisions, and washing ma-
chines, once considered luxuries, are now
available and accessible to the general public. In
conversations with people on the street and in
their homes, it is hard to find a single person
who is unenthusiastic about these fruits of
economic reform.
One bitter fruit
Yet the record of China's economic reform has
not been unblemished. Reform has exacerbated
several existing economic and social problems,
the most serious of which is inflation.
Reform un.leashed an enormous expansion of
market demand ata rate far outstripping that of
output. Rural reform has boosted rural income.
Urban reform has enabled enterprise managers
to give workers indiscriminate bonuses and un-
dertake lavish investment projects.
Fueling all this has been unrestrained bank lend-
ing to enterprises, resulting in annual currency
growth rates averaging 29 percent in 1984
through 1987 and 36 percent in the first half of
1988, compared to an annual average of three
percent in 1961 through 1978. Official data report
retail-price inflation rates of nine percent in 1985,
six percent in 1986,seven percent in 1987, and
13 percent in the first half of this year. But the ac-
tual inflation rates for urban consumers are
believed to have been about double these official
rates.
Actually, inflation is nothing new in China. The
hyper-inflation of 1948-49 was a major factor
contributing to the downfall of the Nationalist
government and the Communists' rise to power
in 1949. One of the crowning achievements of
the new government was its success in bringing
inflation quickly under control in the early 1950s
and keeping the price level stable until 1980, ex-
cept for a brief lapse in the early 1960s. During
most of the period, price stability was maintained
by freezing all prices and wages, and reinforced
by tight control over the money supply and the
LJseofrationCoupons to limit consumption.
Thus, for abouta quarter of a century, the popu-
lation was accustomed to receiving a fixed wage
plus a basket of payments in kind (such as hous-
ing, health care, education, etc.). This assured a
certain standard of living, with no fear of price
increases.
But frozen prices were the very antithesis of the
market mechanism. And so, from the beginning,
the reformers recognized that letting market
forces determine prices was an essential part of
economic reform. However, steps in that direc-
tion have been hesitant and limited, for fear of
their impact on consumer prices. Urban con-
sumer prices have been kept artificially low
through government subsidies. These subsidies
swelled enormously after 1979, when, as a part
of rural reform, farm product prices were raised,
but not urban food prices. Industrial prices over
time became so out of line with production costs
that enterprise profits and losses could no longer
serve as indicators of market demand and supply,
nor of efficiency of management. Underpricing
of energy andtransport in particular resulted in
vast waste in their consumption and serious un-
der-investment in their production.
Partial reform brought about a complicated
three-tiered price structure: "free" prices, "nego-
tiated" prices, and fixed prices-all regulated by
the authorities. This price structure aggravated
price distortions and gave rise to widespread hid-
den side-payments and corruption. And yet this
price structure was not even adequate to control
the rise in overall prices.
Prolonged inflation imposes severe hardships
because China's per capita income still is low,
wages in many sectors remain rigid, and labor
has little job mobility. Rural households can cope
with inflation much better than urban residents
can, because rural households have become
entrepreneurs in largely unregulated business
pursuits. Urban workers, in contrast, depend on
wages and bonuses. Wages have risen minimally,and bonuses have been distributed very unevenly
among sectors and enterprises. Government
workers, school teachers, and retired persons
have been hit especially hard. Moreover, urban
workers are tied to their present employment and
cannot shift jobs without the permission of their
employers. It requires no great imagination to
sense the tremendous frustration and resentment
of those who are caught in this bind.
Policy debate and action
In the micJstof this increasingly explosive situa~
tion, policymakers earlier thisyear were engaged
in an intense debate over the future direction of
economic reform. One school advocated easing
credit and investment restraints in order to sus-
tain rapid economic growth and create a
favorable environment for dismantling all remain-
ing price controls. The resultant inflation they
regarded as a necessary evil, but acceptable with
concomitant wage increases. The other school
advocated freeing up all prices only after infla-
tion was brought under control. This latter
approach called for drastic curtailment of invest-
ment and credit growth and acceptance of a
slower output growth for the sake of bringing in-
flation under control. The pro-growth proponents
regarded this view as unnecessarily timid and
obstructive to economic progress.
For a time, it seemed that the pro-growth advo-
cates were gaining the upper hand. During the
first half of this year, bank credit growth acceler-
ated markedly, and in June a senior official of the
central bank publicly acknowledged a policy of
credit ease. As inflation accelerated, the govern-
ment announced on August 18 a decision to lift
price and wage controls over a five-year period.
However, while the policymakers debated, con-
sumers took to the streets this summer, rushing to
withdraw savings from banks to purchase goods
ahead of further price increases. Rumors of high-
er grain prices led to frenzied buying of rice in
one city. Expectations of a 40 percent price rise
caused shoppers in another city to snap up sixty
thousand pairs of shoes from one store in four
days. A department store in a third city reported
the sale of electric appliances in July at two hun-
dred times the normal level. By late August, these
scattered stirrings had swollen to an avalanche.
Long lines had formed at banks to withdraw
funds, and a senior central bank official had to
deny rumors of banks limiting fund withdrawals.
In the face of this rapidly spreading crisis, the
new five-year price-wage reform program was
abruptly suspended. Premier Li Peng announced
on August 30 that there would be no more price
adjLlstmenfsdLlring the rest of the year, that
measures would be taken to insure a lower infla-
tion rate next year, and that capital investment
and bank lending henceforth would be severely
curtailed. In addition, banks were instructed to
institute new "value-preserving" deposits, tying
interest rates on time deposits of three years or
longer to the cost-of-living index. Less than two
weeks later, a new "temporary" regulation was
promulgated to limit all cash transactions in the
economy to wage payments and farm-product
purchases, and to require all other payments to
be made through bank accounts. The regulation
is apparently intended to restore banks' role as
watchdogs over all spending by enterprises and
government agencies and to revert to the old
method of spending control that had proven
effective prior to reform.
This crisis has revealed a fundamental flaw in
China's economic reform. The reform has re-
leased market forces without instituting effective
macroeconomic policies for restraining public
and private spending,such as used in most mar-
ket economies. In the short run, the authorities in
China have no choice but to re-impose direct
controls. In the longer run, preservation of the
fruits of economic reform and further progress in
reforming China's economy will depend on ef-
fective monetary, financial, and fiscal policies for
macroeconomic stabilization that so far have
been absent in the Chinese economy.
Hang-Sheng Cheng
Vice President, International Studies
Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Barbara Bennett) or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve
publications can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,




Alaska Arizona California Hawaii Idaho
nevada Oregon Utah Washington
;I